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ASSESSMENTS DURING THE MEXICAN WAR
AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY

THOMAS M. DAVIES,

JR.'"

has been written about the war between Mexico and the
United States of the 1840'S. National feeling has inspired varying
interpretations, and the opposing views have been rehashed over
and over again. Yet there are gaps in our knowledge of some aspects
of the struggle. Whatever the reason for neglect of these issues,
they are vital to our understanding of the war as a whole.
The question of United States assessments on the Mexican
authorities during the war itself has received little or no attention.
President James K. Polk, faced with the precarious prospect of obtaining sufficient funds from a hostile Congress, sought a way to
force Mexico to pay the enormous cost of the war. In September
1846, the Mexicans rejected an offer of peace. Up to that time the
U.S. forces had been paying Mexicans liberal prices for supplies.
Now the President decided to confiscate what was needed and to
levy forced contributions on the Mexican authorities. 1 Accordingly, Polk ordered General Taylor to follow this procedure, and
although Taylor certainly tried, it simply was not practicable.
In early 1847, Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker,
sought to alleviate domestic financial difficulties caused by the war
by opening the Mexican ports then under U.S. control and permitting merchandise to enter under a moderate system of duties. With
the assistance of Senator Thomas Hart Benton and the Attorney
General, Nathan Clifford, Polk decided in March that it was his
MUCH

.. The author· wishes to express his appreciation to Professor George W. Smith
not only for his assistance and guidance on this paper, but also for allowing the
author to utilize his personal copies of various important documents.
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constitutional right as Commander-in-Chief to impose and collect
any duties he desired as military contributions. In order to discourage smuggling, Walker lowered duties by one-half and substituted a single, uniform duty of one dollar per ton for all port
dues and charges. 2 Polk ordered the new system into effect on
March 3 I. Nevertheless, these port duties produced very little
revenue because the imported goods were rarely allowed into the
interior. S
Early in the fall of 1847, after another Mexican rejection of
peace, Polk issued
positive orders to General Scott to exact military contributions from
the Mexicans, and especially if he should take and occupy the City
of Mexico. . . . I thought the orders to Gen. Scott should now be
more preemptory and stringent, and that nothing should prevent him
from levying such contributions upon the wealthy inhabitants of
Mexico to defray the expenses of his army, unless he should find that
by adopting such a policy, his army could not be subsisted. 4

Polk continued to press the matter. On September 15 he wrote
in his. diary that Scott had agreed to much too long a truce outside Mexico City and that he should have taken the capital im~
mediately and quickly levied a contribution. 5 On October 4, he
asked Secretary of War William Marcy, to write Scott, "directing
him more stringently than had been done to levy contributions
upon the enemy, and make them as far as practicable defray the
expenses of the war."6 This was unnecessary, for immediately upon
taking Mexico City, Scott had levied such a contribution.
In General Orders No. 287 of September 17, Scott directed that
"a contribution of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars is imposed on this capital, to be paid in four weekly installments of
thirty-seven thousand five hundred dollars each, beginning on
Monday next, the 20th inst., and terminating on Monday, October
I Ith."7 This levy was supposedly in return for the protection which
Scott offered the Mexicans. He promptly used the money to purchase necessities for his men. Twenty thousand dollars went for
the purchase of "extra comforts" for the wounded and sick in
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hospitals, ninety thousand for the purchase of one blanket and two
pairs of boots for each active soldier, and forty thousand for "other
military purposes."8 The Ayuntamiento of Mexico City did not
consider this levy excessive,9and they were able to pay it by obtaining a loan from D. Juan Manuel Lasquety and D. Alejandro
Bellange at the rate of fifteen per cent,10
Scott had made provisions to enable the Ayuntamiento to raise
the levy. He allowed them to retain control of the customhouse
collections, exempting from duties only those supplies belonging
to the quartermaster and commissary departments. l l In addition, he
left the management and revenues of the Post Office to the
Ayuntamiento and allowed it to retain the tobacco monopoly.12 In
return, Scott demanded that the Ayuntamiento submit semi-weekly
reports of the receipts and expenditures of the City Treasury to
the Civil and Military Governor.
.
President Polk, however, was not satisfied. On November 15, he
ordered Scott to impose an export duty on gold and silver exported from Mexico through occupied ports, and also ordered all
internal revenues, as well as import and export duties collected
under Mexican law, to be "seized and appropriated to the use of
our own army and navy. . . ."13 Scott moved quickly to obey.
On November 23, he forbade the Mexican Government to sell
houses, buildings, or estates which belonged to the clergy.14 On
November 25, he issued General Orders No. 358 which dealt
with rents and bullion. 15
This order prohibited further exportation of uncoined bullion,
bars or ingots, either of gold or silver, until the Polk Administration could fix the rate of export duty on the bullion and on gold
and silver coins. No more rents were to be paid for houses or quarters occupied by the officers or troops except when contracts
already existed. Public buildings were to be occupied first and then,
if it became necessary, private buildings were to be commandeered,
"following out the prinCiple of giving the least distress practicable
to the unoffending inhabitants. . . ."16 Although Scott ordered
that all the City revenues be paid over to his offices, he continued
to require the Army to pay for forage and subsistence. 17
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On November 27, Scott wrote to Marcy, calling his attention
to Order 358 and stating that he was engaged in the collection of
statistics of finance in the country for the period just before the
commencement of the war. He then proceeded to outline in some
detail the problems in~erent in the attempt to pay for the occupation:
It is possible that if we should be· able to occupy the principal mining districts and seaports of Mexico, and keep the great highways
clear of guerilleros and other robbers, the per centage on the precious
metals-coinage and exports and duties on increased imports of
foreign commodities might amount to ten or twelve millions a year;
but on the approach of even Mexican troops, in periods of revolution, the miners always run away from their work, and are rarely
brought back in months. The same difficulty may be apprehended
from the approach of our troops.18

Scott went on to point out that the mints, which were almost
entirely in the hands of neutrals, had hired the privilege of coinage
for a term of years. In addition, the local and state revenues could
only be collected if the army occupied the State Capital and
worked through the State authorities. The reason was that, "To
collect such revenue directly, by means of agents of our ownMexican or American-would require a host of civil employees,
involving much extortion, waste, and corruption."19 He added that
with the arrival of adequate reinforcements and with the development of an effective .financial system, he hoped to be able to collect
"at least part of the means necessary to support the occupation."20
On December 2, he strengthened his bullion order of November
25, by ordering that no gold or silver bullion be transported to
any place but a mint, and that no bars or ingots be exported except
those already at U.S.-held ports, and these only after the payment
of five per centum of the value. This five per cent levy also applied
to the exportation of gold and silver coins. Any attempts to evade
the order would result in the confiscation of the bullion or coins in
question. 21
The Polk Administration continued to press Scott for more positive results,22 and Scott responded with additional plans. On
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December 2, he wrote Commodore William B. Shubrick that as
soon as he received reinforcements he would occupy the principal
mining district, and then the State Capitals within his reach;23 In
line with this, Scott wrote to Marcy asking for two columns of five
thousand men each to occupy Zacatecas and San Luis POtOSI, but
he questioned the advisability of passing through Queretaro and
thereby dispersing the Mexican Federal Government,24
The following day, Scott issued one of the more important
orders of the occupation. General Order NO.3 76 stated that since
the army was about to spread itself over the republic, all taxes and
dues within the occupied areas would now accrue to the forces of
occupation. He specifically mentioned that the Federal District and
the States of Mexico, Vera Cruz, Puebla, and T amaulipas should
hereafter pay all usual dues and taxes to the army on the first of
each month, and that other states would fall under the directive as
they were occupied. 25
.The dues and taxes to which he referred were: district taxes,
dues on the production of. gold and silver, melting and assaying
duties, the tobacco rent, the rent on stamped paper, the rent on
the manufacture of playing cards, and the rent of post offices. In
addition, he prohibited the national lotteries and reiterated the order against the exportation of silver and gold in bars or ingots. To
cut down on bureaucratic machinery, Scott also let contracts to the
highest bidder on the rents of tobacco, playing cards, and stamped
paper. 26
Scott immediately sent a copy of .this order to Washington, together with a long memoir on the exportation of precious metals.
He noted that the taxes and dues should· be collected in such a
way as to interfere as little as possible with either domestic. or
foreign interests, particularly the mining and minting interests.
He further noted that the exportation of gold and silver bars had
been prohibited under both the Spanish and Mexican governments, and he recommended that the United States continue this
policy, not only to increase revenues, but also to protect the neutral
foreign companies who had rented the mints. 27
These foreign companies which controlled the mints coined

I
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approximately $15,000,000 yearly and to allow exportation of
bars would ruin· them.· Also, according to Scott, it would Hood
the world market and adversely affect. the gold and silver exchanges of England, France, and the United States. 28 He argued
against a protective duty on exportation for the same reasons, and
further maintained that the duties on coined silver were too high.
There were two' separate duties which totaled ten per cent. The
first was a four per cent circulation duty on specie going from the
interior to the ports, and the second was a six per cent levy on the
specie exported. He argued that these levies had encouraged contraband and revenues· had decreased. He called for the abolition of
the circulation duty and the lowering of the export duty to five
percent. 29
Apparently fearing that Polk might not agree with his logic,
Scott wrote to Marcy on December 17. He again argued that the
exportation of bars or ingots would be a disaster and stated that, "if
we permit the exportation of bars and ingots there will be but little
domestic coinage, our own draughts would soon be under par, and
the Mexicans, from the want of a sufficient circulation medium, be
less able to pay the contributions which we propose to levy upon
them through their civil authorities."30
He was pushing ahead with his plans to occupy the mining districts. He told Marcy that the columns of General Butler and
Colonel Johnson would be in Mexico City the following day, and
thathe would then be in a position to take San Luis PotosL 31 Scott
needed two columns of five thousand effective soldiers each. The
sick and ill-equipped columns under Johnson and Butler were in
no condition to undertake the campaign. 32
Scott therefore chose as immediate objectives, the occupation
of the towns of Pachuca, Lerma, Toluca, and Cuernavaca. Of all
these, Pachuca was perhaps the most important financially because
of its proximity to the large mines of Real del Monte. On the day
he dispatched troops to Pachuca, he wrote Marcy that: "There is
an assay office at Pachuca, to which a large amount of silver bullion is soon to be brought, and if we have not troops present, the
federal officers of Mexico will seize the assay duties to our 10ss."33
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Pachuca was occupied peacefully on December 29,1l4 and heavy
assessments were levied against the other newly captured towns. 35
A few days later, orders from the Polk Administration, regarding assessments, arrived in Mexico City. All export duties exacted
by the Mexican Government before the war were to be paid to
U.S. officials, as were all internal property taxes either on persons
or property which had been previously .levied by any department,
town, or city government. The directive also set the export duties on
precious metals as follows: gold, coined or wrought, three per
cent; silver coin, six percent; silver wrought, with or without Mexican certificates, seven per cent; gold orear dust, three per cent; and
silver ore, seven per cent. 36
Scott then issued the most important directive of the occupation. General Orders No. 395 of December 31, provided a detailed and comprehensive program of assessments. In the first place,
each state, whether occupied or not, was assigned a yearly assessment. This assessment, which was quadruple the direct taxes paid
by the several states in 1844,37 was as follows:
Chihuahua
$ 49,188
Coahuila
5,557
Chiapas
21,692
Durango
85,556
Guanajuato
255,576
Jalisco
236,338
Mexico State and Federal District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 668,332
Michoadm
287,712
Nuevo Leon
50,437
. Oaxaca
84,160
Puebla
.
424,276
Queretaro
85,944
San Luis Potosi
111,260
Sinaloa. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 33,524
Sonora
5,000
Tabasco
59,060
Tamaulipas
71,332
Vera Cruz
" 271,548
Zacatecas-AguascaIientes, reunited
240,076
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As a part of this, the city transit duties, the tobacco monopoly, and
the national lotteries were abolished, and the receipts from the post
offices, playing card monopoly, and stamped paper monopoly were
relinquished to the State governments. S8
The governors and legislatures of the different states were held
responsible for the collection of the federal dues and were to pay
the U.S. Commander one-twelfth of the annual sum on the
first day of each month, either in money or in articles of subsistence
or forage. If the sum was not paid, the U.S. commanders were
ordered to collect the sum by force, in money or in kind from the
wealthier inhabitants of the region. In addition, all parties concerned were required to maintain a rigid accounting of the revenues
received or taken and to report the monthly total to Scott's headquarters. 89
More important, these orders established uniform duties on the
mining, assaying, melting, and ~oinage of' precious metals. The
new rates were:
On production of both gold and silver, three per cent; on melting,
two dollars and fifty cents for every one hundred and thirty-five
marks, the mark being eight ounces; on assaying, one dollar the bar
for bars of silver, or one dollar and fifty cents for bars of gold or of
gold and silver mixed; and on coinage, the percentage on both metals
heretofore paid by the mints according to their contracts with the
Mexican Govemment. 40
. ",

In addition, the collection of dues on production, melting, and
assaying was to be made at the assay offices, and that on coinage at
the respective mints. Officers were sent to both places to oversee the
operation and to submit periodic reports.
This may have been Scott's most far-reaching directive; unfortunately it was almost impossible to enforce. Most of the states had
not been occupied and never would be. Officials. of occupied states
demonstrated amazing dexterity in evading the directives. But the
most serious and exasperating difficulties came in the attempt to enforce the duties on precious metals. Problems quickly arose as
evidenced by. Scott's directive of January 5, 1848. He ordered
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that all bars of silver or gold produced in the mineral districts nearest the assay office in the Capital were to be sent to that office, together with a permit, signed by the nearest U.S. commander, stating the number, kind, and value of the bars. This permit was then
to be returned to the agent of the mine with a deposition that the
proper dues on production, melting, and assaying had been paid. 41
After the bars had been assayed, they were to be sent immediately to the nearest mint for coinage. This was to insure the collection of the coinage dues and also to prevent the illegal exportation of bars. As a further precaution against evasion, a bank was
established at every assay office to maintain an accurate accounting
of the number, weight, and standard of the bars. The Assayer and
the Superintendent of the mint were held responsible for the accuracy of these records.42
Despite these tIght regulations, Scott had every reason to suspect that smuggling of bullion was extensive and would continue
to occur. He therefore ordered that the penalty for any such attempt would include a fine to the owners and shippers equal to the
value of the metals in question. He further announced that,
"Escorts of American troops, when needed and practicable, will
be granted to the precious metals in passing from the mines to
the Assay offices and from the latter to the mints."43
A few days later, Scott appointed Major J. L. Gardner Superintendent of the direct and indirect assessments for the Federal
District. He ordered Gardner to ascertain the amount of assessments due, make demands for their regular payment, and settle all
disputes which might arise. 44 Major Gardner kept a letterbook,
which reveals the actual problems involved in implementing the
bullion decrees. Although Gardner dealt only with the mint and
assay offices in Mexico City, the problems which he encountered
very likely would have occurred in the other mints.
One of Gardner's more difficult problems arose even before he
took office. In early December, 1847, Alex Bellange, the Director
and Proprietor of the Mint (Casa de Moneda) wrote Scott's headquarters that he had rented the mint for ten years from the Mexican Government on February 23, 1847, for $174,000 rent and
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one per cent of the total coinage of the mint, to be paid every three
months. He stated that the coinage from February 23 to July 13
amounted to $701, 106 and that the one per cent of $7,01 1.06 was
paid on July 16. The coinage from July 13 to October 13 amounted
to $365,3°0, and by order of the Mexican Government of July 22,
Bellange paid the one per cent of $3,653 to Dr. Torellaria Casada.
He then stated that the coinage from October 13 to November 30
amounted to $4°5,975, but that the one per cent had not been paid
to the U.S. officers because it was only due every three months. 45
Soon after assuming his duties, Gardner Wrote to Bellange accusing him of violation of his contract with the Mexican Government in that his first payment covered a five-month period and
the second only a three-month period. According to the contract,
Bellange should have made quarter payments on May 23, August
23, and November 23. Gardner demanded the whole dues of the
third quarter or at least that portion dating from September lA,
now due at the mint. He also demanded proof that Bellange had
actually paid the sums to the Mexican authorities, and a complete
statement of the total coinage from February 23, 1847, to January,
1848.46
.
Bellange supplied the receipts as requested, but Gardner wrote
a few days later that although the first quarter payment was irregular, it did not concern the United States Army. The second
payment was another matter because it included· the month of
September and half of October, which fell within the occupation
period. Gardner argued that since the payment was irregular, since
it was not made directly to the Mexican Government, and since
it was made after the occupation of the Capital it could only be regarded as an unadjusted account. Gardner therefore requested a
repayment to his office of the one per cent from September 14 to
October 13. 47
Bellange retorted that the procedure was quite within the terms
of his contract. He stated that by agreement with the Mexican
Government, the payments during times of public disturbance·
would commence from the date of the first delivery of coin,
which was on April 13. Thus the first quarterly payment would
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fall due on July 13 and the second on October 13. He further
argued that the second payment was ordered in advance of the
time when it fell due, and that he had obeyed ,that order before
any orders to the contrary could come from Scott.48 Gardner therefore suggested to Scott that the claims be relinquished because
some doubt existed and because sufficient safeguards had been
created to keep the problem from arising again. Scott approved of
this decision,49 and Gardner informed Bellange that he was no
longer being held responsible for the one per cent between July
13 and October I 3.~o
During his sparring match with Bellange, Gardner was also
engaged in a running, two-month controversy with the Assayer
of the Republic, Dr. Cayetano Buitron. On January 20, Gardner
wrote Buitron requesting him to make careful entries in his book
(Borrador Diario) of the total quantity of precious metals which
had entered the assay office from September 13 to the present date.
He further requested that Buitron then send him the book,51 In
this way Gardner hoped to ascertain what dues on production, melting and assaying had not been paid to the Mexican authorities.
The following day, Buitron sent a book which showed twelve
deposits between January 7 and January 13, 1848. Gardner approved six of these entries as conforming to existing regulations,
but he held that two were of "quantities of which the regular declarations were not made, and for the violation of General Orders on
this point, are to be held by you as subject to confiscation."52 The
remaining four entries were open to controversy. The owners of
the four deposits claimed they had already paid the dues to the
Mexican authorities and had proof to substantiate their claims.
Gardner, however, held since they were made before deposit in
the assay office and after the promulgation of General Orders No.
395, that Buitron would be held accountable for the payment of
said dues amounting to $975.80.53
The owners replied that, in the absence of any U.S. forces, the
payments were coerced by the Mexican Government. Moreover
these payments took place before they learned of the existence of
Scott's orders. Gardner then suggested to Scott that, since they
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could not have obeyed the law even if they knew of it, the claim
be canceled.54
Implicit in Gardner's recommendations was the fear that strict
enforcement of the regulations might result in the mine owners
withholding their metals from the assay office. Scott recognized this
very danger and wrote: "The practical suggestions that the enforcement of our demands, would probably cause a large amount of the
precious metals to be withheld from the mint of this capital, alone
induces me to concur in the conclusion of the superintendent."55
The book which Buitron sent on January 21 did not contain
an exact report of the quantity of silver and gold sent from the
assay office to the mint in the period September 13 to January I,
so Gardner demanded that he comply with the order. 56 Buitron
replied on the same day, asserting that his office had been sacked
on September 14, and that everything in it, including books and
archives, had been destroyed. But on January 29, he wrote that,
in order to meet his responsibilities to the Mexican Government,
he had sent the books of his office to the Tribunal of Accounts in
Queretaro. 57
These figures were vitally important to Gardner, for without
them he was unable to ascertain the amount of precious metal
which had passed from the assay office to the mint and was therefore unable to assess the proper dues. In addition, he had no way
of determining the amount of dues on production, melting, and
assay Buitron still held in his hands or had paid illegally to the
;Mexican authorities.
As a result Gardner was quick to jump on the discrepancy in
Buitron's explanation of the fate of the record books. Regarding
the claim that they had been sent to Queretaro, he wrote: '''I
either mistake your meaning or this is in direct contradiction of
the statement in your letter of the 21st by which it is emphatically
stated 'every book' was destroyed."58 Gardner also questioned
, whether Buitron had indeed sent all his records, including vouchers
and memorandum. In short, he ordered him to comply or face the
consequences as set down in General Orders No. 395. li9
As Buitron's replies became more and more evasive, Gardner
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finally laid the matter before Scott. He informed him of the continued requests for the financial records and of Buitr6n's irrelevant
and contradictory replies. He also noted that Buitr6n no doubt
had the books after December 3 I, and had sent them to Queretaro
to evade Order No. 395. If this were true, it would in part explain
Buitr6n's evasive responses and his pretense of not understanding
Gardner's orders. Gardner summed up the matter by stating:
My suspicion now is that this man is the tool of others, that the dues
on production, melting and assaying-amounting as I think they must,
to more than three times the dues on coinage, in the period which
I have endeavored to explore-have been embezzled to his own use
and that of his co-adjutors and that he attempted to escape responsibility by mystification and evasion. If this suspicion be well
founded· the remedy I suppose will consist in taking forcible possession of the assay Department (and mint for they are both in the
same building) and in seizing the person of the assayer for imprisonment, and the silver for confiscation.60

The following day, Gardner wrote Buitr6n that unless he produced an accurate and clearly written document and sent it to the
assessment office "by 12 o'clock of the 3rd current, the penalties
provided for in existing orders will be applied."6l This was not an
idle threat, for on March 3, between noon and one o'clock, both
the Assay Department and the mint were closed and locked. 62
Buitr6n finally submitted a report on March 9, but it was no more
satisfactory than previous ones, because it was merely "a re-iteration
in speCific terms of your former answers to my demands, and therefore leaves the matter in controversy, with its doubtfulness and
contradiction in the same unsatisfactory state."63 Nevertheless, the
Assay Department and the mint were reopened and Buitr6n was
allowed to continue as assayer.
Thus in the cases of both Bellange and Buitr6n, Gardner and
Scott found it necessary to capitulate. They lacked documented
proof to back up their directives. Although the situation was hardly
satisfactory, it was far more expedient and profitable to keep the
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assay office and the mint functioning so as to collect what dues they
could.
Their pragmatic attitude was demonstrated again in the controversy with William de Decisina & Co. This company sent
twenty-six bars of metal to the assay office for the payment of dues,
but wanted them returned intact or uncoined. Gardner ordered
Bellange to hold the bars in question, along with thirty others,
until a decision could be reached by the Commanding GeneraP4
The matter was finally settled in-late April by Gardner's successor
Major George A. Caldwell. Caldwell instructed Buitron to return
all bars, bundles, and pieces of bullion to those who wished them
uncoined. 65 Another section of Orders No. 395 was abandoned.
The problems faced by Gardner and Scott in the collection of
dues on precious metals were indicative of the problems they faced
in all areas of assessments. Despite the vast time and manpower expended, the returns were slight. For example, during the period
from October 13, 1847, to February, 1848, the one per cent duty
on coinage amounted to only $8229.3°.66 Revenues on the pro- .
duction, melting, and assaying of precious metals were somewhat
larger, but they still fell far short of what was expected. 6 'l'
The fact was that the United States Command simply could not
enforce its bullion decrees. Most of the mines were owned and
operated by foreign neutrals whom Scott did not wish to alienate.
bI addition, Scott did not have the men to seize, hold, or protect
the mines and the supply routes to them. And, as we have seen,
when the ore did reach the capital, the Mexican authorities were
fairly successful in evading the duties.
The same conditions prevailed in other assessment areas. The
importation of American tobacco ruined the effectiveness of tobacco
monopoly, and other monopolies also had to be surrendered for
administrative reasons. 68 The various state assessments were, for the
most part, unenforceable. The order against paying rents was likewise impracticable because many of the rented buildings belonged
to friends or neutrals. It should also be noted that one of the
cornerstones of Scott's occupation policy was to interfere as little as
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possible with civilians, local governments, and municipal revenues.
All of these factors combined to militate against the succesful
collection of assessments. Polk had hoped to pay for the war with
assessments, and although Scott's expectations were less pretentious, he himself hoped to collect as much as twenty-three million.
Both men were far too optimistic, for the net proceeds, including
$106,928 turned in by naval officers, amounted to only $3,935,676.69 Considering that the total cost of the war exceeded one
hundred million dollars, the assessment program must be viewed as
a failure, but, in all fairness to Scott and his men, it is doubtful
that anyone with any other plan could have produced better results.
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2. Ibid., p. 263.
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